

Combating Terrorism

A Compendium of Recent Counterterrorism Recommendations From Authoritative Commissions and Subject Matter Experts

September 16, 2001

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COMBATING TERRORISM

A COMPENDIUM OF RECENT COUNTERTERRORISM
RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM
AUTHORITATIVE COMMISSIONS
AND
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE



September 16, 2001

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INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Terrorist attacks over the last decade have grown in violence and sophistication, culminating in the worst attack ever on September 11. The threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests around the world has become the Nation's most pressing national security issue. In recent years several high-level, expert commissions have addressed the threat of terrorist attacks against the United States and have made specific recommendations to enhance our efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist acts.

The Institute for Security Technology Studies (ISTS) at Dartmouth College has synthesized key reports on terrorism and homeland defense in order to provide policymakers with a synopsis of the main recommendations where consensus was reached on issues of resources, substantive legislation, or research. This report is not meant to replace the work of the underlying recommendations of the experts, but rather to serve as an easy guide to those recommendations in an effort to facilitate the work of those considering immediate action to improve our counterterrorism capabilities.

This document is comprised of two primary sections: The first section is a summary of specific recommendations for measures that directly address the type of terrorist attacks that we witnessed on September 11, 2001. The second section summarizes general recommendations concerning the United States' overall counterterrorism and homeland defense posture.

Selected Key Recommendations:

1. Increase funding for counterterrorism activity of the intelligence community and for the development of counterterrorism technology (Page 7).
2. Lift the restrictions on recruiting foreign intelligence informants or operatives who have previously been involved in human rights violations (Page 8).
3. Deploy existing new technologies to improve airport security - e.g. biometrics systems and explosive detections systems (Page 5)
4. Allocate additional resources to airport and aviation security (Page 6).
5. Foster international cooperation in the war against terrorism (Page 8).

For your reference, we have included a CD with electronic copies of the five major reports summarized herein.

We are hopeful that this document and the accompanying CD will assist policymakers as they quickly focus on how to enhance the Nation's counterterrorism capabilities – not tomorrow, but today.

C O M B A T I N G T E R R O R I S M
A COMPENDIUM OF RECENT COUNTERTERRORISM RECOMMENDATIONS

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KEY NATIONAL REPORTS SUMMARIZED IN THIS DOCUMENT

- U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century, ‘Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change’, January 31, 2001. (Hart-Rudman Report)
- Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’, December 15, 2000. (Gilmore Commission Report)
- National Commission on Terrorism, ‘Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress, June 5, 2000.
- National Defense Panel, ‘Transforming Defense in the 21st Century’, December 1997.
- White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, February 12, 1997. (Gore Commission)

Please see the attached resource listing attached at the end of this document for a complete list of works consulted for this effort.

Please also see the attached appendix of expert commission membership.

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RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE TYPE OF ATTACKS THAT OCCURRED ON SEPTEMBER 11

The following recommendations address measures that may well have helped prevent the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Additional measures will surely be proposed as experts analyze shortcomings in our security and intelligence activities that come to light in the aftermath of those attacks. Nevertheless these expert recommendations from recent years offer a useful starting point.

AIRPORT AND AVIATION SECURITY

Introduction

Aviation disasters such as the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and the explosion of TWA flight 800 in 1996 led to close scrutiny of airport and aviation security in recent years. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Gore Commission). It issued its report in February 1997, urging that “the federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue.”¹ In addition, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has produced 15 reports on airport and aviation security since 1996. However, despite these sustained efforts to improve security, a senior GAO official testified before Congress on April 6, 2000 that “the chain of security protecting our aviation system has not one but several weak links.”² The following recommendations have been made by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), and the General Accounting Office (GAO) in relation to airport and aviation security:

Improve screening practices and procedures

According to the Congressional testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division United States General Accounting Office in April 2000, the “FAA and the airline industry have made little progress in improving the effectiveness of airport checkpoint screeners. Screeners are not adequately detecting dangerous objects, and long-standing problems affecting screeners' performance remain, such as rapid screener turnover and the inattention to screener training. FAA's efforts to address these problems are behind schedule.”³ The FAA has sought to “improve screening checkpoints through better training and testing using advanced technologies, background checks for screeners, performance incentives, and better screening equipment and procedures.”⁴ The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommends that the FAA should “certify screening companies and improve screener performance.”⁵ Other security issues that have been debated are the policy of allowing knives on aircraft, weak cockpit security, and the possibility of federalizing airport security staff.⁶ A task force, led by U.S. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, will be established to review airport and aviation security and make recommendations by October 1, 2001.

Improve staff selection and training

Airport security staff, and particularly screeners, who are responsible for identifying weapons and explosive devices in baggage, are poorly trained and badly paid. Many security duties at the nation's largest airports are outsourced; according to the GAO, some screeners earn less than airport fast-food staff – as little as \$6 an hour.⁷ To tackle the problem, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommends that the “FAA should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce,”⁸ while the FAA plans to “strengthen the baseline of security through better selection and training of screeners and other security personnel.”⁹ According to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, one method to provide more competent security personnel would be “the creation of a nationwide non-profit security corporation, funded by the airlines, to handle airport security.”¹⁰

Prevent unauthorized access to planes and secure airport areas

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended that the “FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively identified and complete security procedures before they board aircraft.”¹¹ As part of this security strategy, there have been calls for the development of an automated passenger profiling system and increasing the frequency of passenger inspections.¹² Moreover, lax security facilitates unauthorized and unchecked access to planes and secure airport areas by people using falsified law enforcement credentials.¹³ In its 1996 strategic plan, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) listed one of its key long-term security goals as being to “improve access and movement control by precisely defining secure areas, refining challenge procedures, increasing accountability, and performing better background checks for people who will control access, and requiring better identification for those allowed access.”¹⁴ Included under these measures would not only be security personnel, but also servicing, catering, cleaning and baggage handling staff. Measures already introduced since the September 11 attacks include restricting the use of e-tickets.¹⁵

Deploy new security technologies

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security strongly recommended the deployment of existing technology to improve security.¹⁶ In this context, recommendations have included explosives detection systems (EDS), nonmagnetic scanners, voice and data communications, navigations systems (such as GPS), to exactly pinpoint an aircraft's location and course, and information systems, “to ensure protection against outside interference, disruption and corruption.”¹⁷ Experts have also discussed the introduction of biometrics systems¹⁸, such as the face-scanning technology used at Super Bowl XXXV in Florida, to identify known and suspected terrorists at crowded airport terminals. The technology uses surveillance camera images and checks them against a database of offenders. Finally, the FAA has already been testing the use of Threat Image Projection (TIP) technology to improve screener diligence (TIP modifies the X-ray machines used at security checkpoints so that they occasionally project images of dangerous objects, such as weapons and explosives, in order to test screener attentiveness).¹⁹ Furthermore, the Commission makes a clear commitment to the

development of new technologies to fight terrorist attacks, recommending “the establishment of a new joint government - industry partnership whose mission will be to accelerate research and development to enhance the security of air travel.”²⁰

Develop measurable security strategies and verify their implementation

All of the authoritative bodies that have been involved with aviation security have agreed that a comprehensive security strategy is required to protect against terrorist attacks. Such a strategy would include setting specific targets and measuring actual performance against these targets. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security underlines that “the FAA should develop standards for continuous safety improvement, and target its regulatory resources based on performance against those standards.”²¹

Allocate additional resources to airport and aviation security

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security is unequivocal on this point: “The Commission recommends that the federal government commit greater resources to improving aviation security.”²² Significantly, Congress agreed to \$160 million in federal funds for capital costs associated with improving security as called for by the Commission’s initial report. However, the Commission further recommended that: “As part of its ongoing commitment, the federal government should devote significant resources, of approximately \$100 million annually, to meet capital requirements identified by airport consortia and the FAA. The Commission recognizes that more is needed. The Commission expects the National Civil Aviation Review Commission to consider a variety of options for additional user fees that could be used to pay for security measures including, among others, an aviation user security surcharge, the imposition of local security fees, tax incentives and other means.”²³

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Introduction

One of the primary means for preventing terrorism is intelligence. Good intelligence can allow the U.S. government to learn of terrorists' plans, disrupt their plots, and gain advance warning about impending attacks. Changes and enhancements in intelligence gathering practices, procedures and technologies have been the subject of several major reports on counterterrorism and homeland defense. The following are recommendations derived from a number of reports that focus on developing intelligence capabilities that function effectively in times of rapid technological development and information overload:

Improve intelligence gathering and dissemination

Since the end of the Cold War, many critics of the American intelligence community have argued that its role and capabilities have been diminished, due to the lack of a single, coherent enemy. Significantly, all the major commissions on counterterrorism and homeland defense in the past two years, including the U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century (Hart – Rudman Report), the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) and the National Commission on Terrorism,²⁴ have emphasized that the fight against terrorism can be won only with the help of a well-functioning, adequately resourced intelligence system. In the words of the Gilmore Commission: "The need for lawful, timely collection and analysis of intelligence on foreign terrorist plots, outside or inside our borders, is accordingly one of the most critical functional capabilities needed by this nation."²⁵ To this end proposals for revisions in federal law regarding greater capabilities in relation to electronic surveillance and wire-tapping are being considered by Attorney General Ashcroft.²⁶ Improving intelligence gathering and dissemination has a number of components:

Need for national intelligence priorities:

The Hart – Rudman Report recommends that "the President order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence...the point is that policy and strategic guidance for intelligence should be formulated in tandem."²⁷ In order to be able to develop national priorities, however, regular threat assessments should be conducted.²⁸

Additional funding for intelligence overall:

Both the nature of threats and the forms of intelligence activity have expanded in recent years. Moreover, the rapid development of new technologies is forcing intelligence agencies to stretch their resources. The Hart – Rudman Commission concludes: "to ensure the continuing technological strength of the (intelligence) community, and to build cutting-edge intelligence platforms, there is no escaping the need for an increase in overall resources for the intelligence community."²⁹ According to the National Commission on Terrorism, "Funding for counterterrorism efforts by the CIA, NSA (National Security Agency), and FBI must be given higher priority to ensure continuation

of important operational activity and to close the technology gap that threatens their ability to collect and exploit terrorist communications.”³⁰

Revitalize human intelligence (HUMINT):

All the major reports emphasize the vital importance of strengthening human intelligence gathering.³¹ Especially as terrorist organizations become more aware of electronic and satellite surveillance efforts, and render themselves harder targets, human intelligence operatives with the necessary language skills and knowledge of the region could become the only way to gather useful intelligence on terrorist operations. As stated by the Hart – Rudman Commission: “The Director of Central Intelligence should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the intelligence community’s highest priorities, and ensure that operational guidelines are balanced between security needs and respect for American values and principles.”³² In this context, the Hart – Rudman report, the Gilmore Commission and the National Commission on Terrorism all recommend lifting the ban on recruiting foreign intelligence informants or operatives who have previously been involved in human rights violations.³³ Experts and lawmakers have also debated reversing the ban on using covert agents to assassinate foreigners, which has been in place for 25 years.³⁴

Integration and application of new technologies:

Terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization are increasingly utilizing cutting-edge technology, such as encryption and steganography, in order to protect their communications against interception. All the major reports on counterterrorism and homeland defense echo the view that, in order to improve predictive capabilities, U.S. intelligence efforts must incorporate the latest technologies in data collection, storage, dissemination and analysis.³⁵ Through electronic surveillance systems and satellites, the United States currently collects masses of raw data, but “the sheer volume of information creates the possibility of information overload if the proper filters are not in place.”³⁶ In fact, it is quite possible that clues to the terrorist attacks of September 11 were intercepted, but not processed and disseminated in a timely way.³⁷ Therefore, it becomes of pivotal importance to apply technologies that support rapid data analysis and dissemination. Moreover, the National Commission on Terrorism has stressed that: “All U.S. government agencies face a drastic shortage of linguists to translate raw data into useful information. This shortage has a direct impact on counterterrorism efforts.”³⁸ In response to this deficiency, the Commission recommends that: “The Director of Central Intelligence should authorize the Foreign Language Executive Committee to develop a larger pool of linguists and an interagency strategy for employing them, including flexible approaches to reduce problems related to handling of classified information.”³⁹

Improve domestic information sharing and international cooperation:

The enormous amounts of data collected around the globe necessitate a comprehensive plan to develop structures for information sharing among agencies in the U.S. intelligence community. The Gilmore Commission recommends “more must be done to provide timely information –up, down, and laterally, at all levels of government- to those who need the information to provide effective deterrence, interdiction, protection and response

to potential threats.”⁴⁰ Ongoing information exchanges with friendly governments would also provide a greater chance to successfully combat organizations that operate globally.

In the mid-1990s, an internal government group of experts made numerous recommendations for improving the sharing of information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.⁴¹ Many of those recommendations have already been implemented. One recommendation that has not been implemented was to amend Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to permit law enforcement agencies to share with intelligence agencies relevant information derived from criminal wiretaps.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND FIRST RESPONSE

Introduction

A counterterrorism and homeland defense strategy must incorporate not only prevention and protection, but also response to attacks that do occur.⁴² Even as we recognize and applaud the heroic efforts of the first responders in New York City and at the Pentagon, it is clear that the capabilities of first responders to terrorist attacks can be enhanced. The following passages detail emergency management and first response recommendations:

Emergency Management

The Gilmore Commission addresses operational coordination of emergency management efforts between Federal, State and local and agencies. If created, standardized National structures and procedures could be utilized in the case of any domestic emergency including a terrorist attack. Recommended focus areas are as follows:

Improved Coordination Of Emergency Management Tasks:

1. Place heightened emphasis on involving State and local agencies in all aspects of emergency management, as they will usually be the first entities on the scene.
2. Increase funding, in the following areas, for emergency management and domestic preparedness programs to combat terrorism:
 - a) The development of a “model” State emergency management plan.
 - b) Conduct an inventory of existing State and local programs and capabilities from which to leverage in the National context and provide a road map for identifying gaps.
 - c) Provide incentives for National and multi-state mutual assistance compacts.
 - d) Provide incentive for tactical operational planning to facilitate “second wave” capabilities.
 - e) Develop a standardized Incident Command System (ICS) / Unified Command System (UCS) or a hybrid model for operational response to major incidents. This should include a template for jurisdictions with ICS / UCS to coordinate decision-making structures based on the nature of the situation.
 - f) Improve coordination of emergency management tasks between different first responder services and agencies and ensure the interoperability of communications systems.

First Response

The Gilmore Commission recommended that the federal government, as well as State and local entities, should provide resources and support to State and local first responder agencies for training and equipment.⁴³ This would ensure that first responders are adequately prepared for major terrorist attacks, are aware of their roles and

responsibilities within the overall response effort, and have the necessary equipment and infrastructure in place to conduct their mission. Responsibility and funding for these critical functions is currently fragmented among organizations and structures such as the Department of Justice and Department of Defense. The following paragraphs highlight key first response recommendations:

Training

1. Conduct an inventory from a National standpoint of current first responder training programs to use as a roadmap for increased funding at all levels.
2. Restructure training to account for the high number of volunteer personnel that constitute the ranks of first responders.
3. Develop more major National training exercises (such as “Top Officials 2000” or “TOPOFF”) that facilitate the development of major interagency and inter governmental situational response capabilities. Such national exercises must include an independent evaluation mechanism.

Equipment

1. Provide flexible federal funding for first responder equipment at the State level.
2. Fund research into best practices, end user evaluations, and continue efforts to find deficiencies and correct them.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

Introduction

The single-most prevalent issue reported in the recent expert studies is the need for a national strategy for counterterrorism. The Hart – Rudman Commission recommended that the “President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.”⁴⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, threats to the Nation have become more diverse, both geographically and conceptually, but no single plan for the whole federal government has been designed to establish objectives, priorities and required resources.⁴⁵

Several expert groups have also addressed structural and strategic issues relating to the United States’ ability to successfully fight terrorism. The Gilmore Commission captured the general sentiments in stating that the necessary changes will require “significant resource commitments”, as well as the will to implement policy changes, “both in organization as well as process,” while forcing us to “overcome daunting technological challenges.” The following is a summary of the groups’ specific recommendations:

Develop a comprehensive threat and risk assessment

The GAO has argued that in order develop a national counterterrorism strategy, the federal government must conduct a comprehensive assessment of the threats and risks of terrorism. This assessment is crucial to guide both strategy and resource investment.⁴⁶

Create a single office/entity for counterterrorism coordination and policy formulation

Both the Gilmore Commission and H.R. 525 recommended centralizing counterterrorism policy and coordination authority within a single office in the Executive Branch. The Gilmore commission recommends that the President “establish a National Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President, and should seek a statutory basis for this office.”⁴⁷ The GAO’s report on H.R. 525 outlines legislation to create a President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness within the Executive office of the President.⁴⁸ The Senate Appropriations Bill for the Federal Judiciary and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State for FY 2002 includes proposed funding for the creation of a Deputy Attorney General For Combating Domestic Terrorism within the Department of Justice.⁴⁹

Determine and clarify jurisdiction among multiple federal agencies dealing with counterterrorism and homeland defense

Several reports concluded that “significant changes must be made in the structure and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus.”⁵⁰ At present, responsibility for protecting against terrorist attacks -- preventing such attacks from taking place and responding if they do -- is distributed among two dozen departments and agencies and all fifty states. “The Executive Branch, with full participation of Congress, needs to realign,

refine, and rationalize these assets into a coherent whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle for implementation.”⁵¹ While most of the main reports agree on the notion of some form of organizational realignment and clarification of jurisdictions, the Hart – Rudman report proposes the creation of a new agency, the National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), “with responsibility for planning, coordinating and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.”⁵² The NHSA would incorporate the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Domestic Preparedness Office, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), in order to create a single point of accountability and responsibility; consolidate homeland security activities, improve effectiveness, establish clear planning and response mechanisms and ensure the availability of adequate resources and capabilities. Legislation supporting these recommendations has already been introduced (H. R. 1158, National Homeland Security Agency Act).

Consolidate the Congressional structure of committees dealing with counterterrorism and homeland defense

Both the Gilmore Commission and the Hart – Rudman Report recommended the consolidation of congressional committee structures to subsume all the activities related to counterterrorism and homeland defense under a single committee for combating terrorism.⁵³ A number of congressional committees and sub-committees have oversight for different aspects of counterterrorism and jurisdictions can sometimes be confusing and overlapping. Thus, the creation of a single committee with sole substantive jurisdiction, including appropriations and oversight responsibility, would provide central legislative direction for the fight against terrorism.

Provide additional resources for counterterrorism

The National Commission on Terrorism, the Gilmore Commission and the Hart – Rudman Report recommend the allocation of additional resources to support the national counterterrorism effort.⁵⁴ While some of the needs to fund America’s immediate response to the September 11 attacks have already been addressed by Congress, the reports call for a sustained commitment to counterterrorism and homeland defense. Funding efforts should focus on intelligence gathering, State and local first responders, weapons of mass destruction and cyber threats, as well as research and development (see below) and raising national proficiency in math and sciences⁵⁵.

Provide additional resources for counterterrorism research and development (R&D)

In order to maintain technological superiority over hostile adversaries, who themselves are increasingly utilizing new technologies, such as encryption and steganography, it is vital to increase funding of counterterrorism research and development (R&D) programs. In fact, the Hart – Rudman report recommends “doubling the federal research and development budget by 2010.”⁵⁶ According to the Gilmore Commission, clear research priorities should be set and research and development should be conducted both for innovative, short-term projects and strategic, long-term solutions. “Priorities for targeted research should be responder personnel protective equipment; medical surveillance,

identification, and forensics; improved sensor and rapid readout capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications interoperability.”⁵⁷

Foster international cooperation in the fight against terrorism

All the major reports urge better international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. By assembling a coalition of states committed to fighting terrorism, and putting pressure on those states that support or harbor terrorists, the U.S. and its allies can deprive terrorist groups of safe havens from which to plan and execute their strikes. In this context, the National Commission on Terrorism proposes increasing “publicity of activities of state sponsors and countries designated as ‘Not Cooperating Fully’ through special reports, making extensive use of the Internet.”⁵⁸ The National Commission on Terrorism further backs international efforts to curtail the flow of financial support for terrorist organizations by recommending that the “U.S. should ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism.”⁵⁹

EXPERT COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP

U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century

'Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change'. (Hart-Rudman Report)

Gary Hart, Co-Chair
Warren B. Rudman, Co-Chair
Anne Armstrong, Commissioner
Norman Augustine, Commissioner
John Dancy, Commissioner
John R. Galvin, Commissioner
Leslie H. Gelb, Commissioner
Newt Gingrich, Commissioner
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Lionel H. Olmer, Commissioner
Donald B. Rice, Commissioner
James Schlesinger, Commissioner
Harry D. Train, Commissioner
Andrew Young, Commissioner

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

'Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism'. (Gilmore Commission Report)

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***White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report.
(Gore Commission)***

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Laura D'Andrea Tyson
Carl W. Vogt
George H. Williams

RESOURCE LISTING

DATE	RESOURCE
January 31, 2001	U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century, 'Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change'. (Hart-Rudman Report)
December 15, 2000	Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 'Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism', (Gilmore Commission Report)
June 5, 2000	National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress.
December 1997	National Defense Panel, 'Transforming Defense in the 21st Century'.
February 12, 1997	White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report. (Gore Commission)
September 16, 2001	'Ashcroft: Tougher Laws to Fight Terrorism', CNN.
September 16, 2001	David Johnston and Neil Lewis, '2 Suspected Hijackers were sought by FBI at time of Attacks' New York Times.
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C O M B A T I N G T E R R O R I S M
A COMPENDIUM OF RECENT COUNTERTERRORISM RECOMMENDATIONS

September 13, 2001	Ed Scannell and Cathleen Moore, 'Airport technology expected to improve in attack aftermath', Computerworld.
September 13, 2001	Ned Stafford, 'Newspaper: Echelon Gave Authorities Warning of Attacks', Newsbytes
September 13, 2001	Greg Sandoval and Troy Wolverton, 'U.S. puts new restrictions on e-tickets', C-Net News.
May 9, 2001	General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, 'Combating Terrorism – Comments on H.R 525 to Create a President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness'.
April 24, 2001	General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, 'Combating Terrorism – Observations on options to improve the Federal Response'.
September 29, 2000	General Accounting Office (GAO), 'Aviation Security – Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in Carriage of Weapons Regulations' (GAO/RCED-00-181 B-285597).
June 5, 2000	Government Computer News, 'Is this a gun or just a security test?'
June 5, 2000	National Commission on Terrorism: Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.
June 1, 2000	The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 'Biometrics', (IAC-ACC-NO: 63649260).
May 25, 2000	General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, 'Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports', (GAO/T-OSI-00-10).

C O M B A T I N G T E R R O R I S M
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April 6, 2000	Prepared testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division United States General Accounting Office, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Aviation, subject – ‘Aviation security vulnerabilities still exist in the aviation security system’.
September 26, 1997	See General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, ‘Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy’ (GAO/NSIAD-97-254).
January 1996	Federal Aviation Administration – Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA.

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ENDNOTES TO SELECTED DOCUMENTS

- ¹ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report (Gore Commission), February 12, 1997
- ² Prepared testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division United States General Accounting Office, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Aviation, subject – ‘Aviation security vulnerabilities still exist in the aviation security system’, April 6, 2000
- ³ Ibid.,
- ⁴ Federal Aviation Administration – Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, January 1996
- ⁵ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, Op. Cit.,
- ⁶ Gilbert M. Gaul, James V. Grimaldi and Joby Warwick, ‘How Terror Could Break Through’, Washington Post September 16, 2001.
- ⁷ Prepared testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division United States General Accounting Office, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Aviation, Op. Cit.,
- ⁸ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, Op. Cit.,
- ⁹ Federal Aviation Administration – Strategic Plan 1996, Op. Cit.,
- ¹⁰ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, Op. Cit.,
- ¹¹ Ibid.,
- ¹² See General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, ‘Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy’ (GAO/NSIAD-97-254), September 26, 1997 and the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, Op. Cit.,
- ¹³ A GAO report targeting access security at federal agencies and airports found that security is seriously deficient: “Our agents were 100-percent successful in penetrating the targeted sites and at no time were their bogus credentials or badges challenged by anyone”, General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, ‘Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports’, (GAO/T-OSI-00-10), May 25, 2000. Furthermore, “falsified law enforcement credentials could be used to receive authorization from airlines to fly while armed”, General Accounting Office (GAO), ‘Aviation Security – Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in Carriage of Weapons Regulations’ (GAO/RCED-00-181 B-285597), September 29, 2000
- ¹⁴ Federal Aviation Administration – Strategic Plan 1996, Op. Cit.,
- ¹⁵ Greg Sandoval and Troy Wolverton, ‘U.S. puts new restrictions on e-tickets’, C-Net News, September 13, 2001
- ¹⁶ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, Op. Cit.,
- ¹⁷ Ibid.,
- ¹⁸ Biometrics technology uses physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial characteristics or retina scans, to authenticate identity. According to an FBI fact sheet: “Simply put, biometrics work well. Systems currently on the market can successfully identify and authenticate people with a high degree of accuracy.” The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, ‘Biometrics’, (IAC-ACC-NO: 63649260), June 1, 2000. For a recent discussion of possible new airport technologies, including facial recognition systems see: Ed Scannell and Cathleen Moore, ‘Airport technology expected to improve in attack aftermath’, Computerworld, September 13, 2001
- ¹⁹ Government Computer News, ‘Is this a gun or just a security test?’ June 5, 2000

- ²⁰ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report, Op. Cit.,
- ²¹ Ibid.,
- ²² Ibid.,
- ²³ Ibid.,
- ²⁴ Hart – Rudman Report, Phase III, U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century, ‘Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change’, January 31, 2001; Gilmore Commission / Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’, December 15, 2000; National Commission on Terrorism: Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June 5, 2000
- ²⁵ Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit., p.19.
- ²⁶ ‘Ashcroft: Tougher Laws to Fight Terrorism’, CNN, September 16, 2001.
- ²⁷ Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit., p.83.
- ²⁸ The Gilmore Commission argues for improved threat assessment capabilities, whereby the FBI would play an integral part in “tracking and analyzing terrorism indicators and warnings.” an integral part. Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit., p. 22.
- ²⁹ Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit., p.85.
- ³⁰ National Commission on Terrorism, Op. Cit., p iv.
- ³¹ Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit., National Defense Panel: ‘Transforming Defense in the 21st Century’, December 1997; National Commission on Terrorism, Op. Cit., The Gilmore Commission asserted that “reliance on sophisticated ‘National Technical Means’ or other high-technology systems is not always sufficient to provide the necessary and timely ‘indication and warning’ to forestall or to defend against a terrorist attack.” Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit., p.20.
- ³² Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit., p.83.
- ³³ Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit., p.83. National Commission on Terrorism, Op. Cit., p.8. Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit., p.20.
- ³⁴ James Risen ‘Lawmakers See Need To Loosen Rules On CIA’ New York Times, September 16, 2001.
- ³⁵ The National Defense Panel concludes that “Along with improved data sharing, our intelligence structure must use the best technology available to create nodal links that disseminate information and facilitate analysis,” National Defense Panel, Op. Cit.,p.63.
- ³⁶ Ibid.,p.64.
- ³⁷ According to unconfirmed reports by Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), “U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies received warning signals at least three months ago that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture.” Ned Stafford, ‘Newspaper: Echelon Gave Authorities Warning of Attacks’, Newsbytes, September 13, 2001. “Furthermore, two of the suspected hijackers of the plane that crashed into the Pentagon were known associates of Osama Bin Laden and had been sought by the FBI, yet they bought tickets and boarded the aircraft using their own names.” David Johnston and Neil Lewis, ‘2 Suspected Hijackers were sought by FBI at time of Attacks’ New York Times, September 16, 2001.
- ³⁸ National Commission on Terrorism, Op.Cit.,p.14.
- ³⁹ Ibid.,p.15.
- ⁴⁰ Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit.,p.19.
- ⁴¹ Joint Intelligence Community-Law Enforcement Group (JICLE).

⁴² Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit.,p.11.

⁴³ Ibid.,p14.

⁴⁴ Ibid.,p11.

⁴⁵ The Attorney General , pursuant to a directive from Congress in 1998, developed a 5-Year Counterterrorism Plan. This plan, though written by the Nation's chief law enforcement officer pursuant to congressional direction, does not provide an overall strategy for the U.S. government, since it does not address military, intelligence, and diplomatic strategies.

⁴⁶ General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, 'Combating Terrorism – Observations on options to improve the Federal Response', April 24, 2001.,p.6.

⁴⁷ Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit.,p.v.

⁴⁸ General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, 'Combating Terrorism – Comments on H.R 525 to Create a President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness', May 9, 2001,p.2.

⁴⁹ Senate Rpt. 107-42 - Departments Of Commerce, Justice, And State, The Judiciary, And Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2002 – available at <ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cp107/sr042.txt>

⁵⁰ Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit.,p.viii.

⁵¹ Ibid.,p.10.

⁵² Ibid.,p.15.

⁵³ While the Hart – Rudman Report proposed establishing a Homeland Security Committee in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Gilmore Commission supported either a joint Special Committee for Combating Terrorism, or a separate committee in each house. Ibid.,p.28
Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit.,p.vii.

⁵⁴ National Commission on Terrorism, Op. Cit., Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit., Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit.,

⁵⁵ National Commission on Terrorism, Op. Cit., Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit., Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit.,

⁵⁶ Hart – Rudman Report, Op. Cit.,p.32.

⁵⁷ Gilmore Commission, Op. Cit.,p.38.

⁵⁸ National Commission on Terrorism, Op. Cit.,p.25.

⁵⁹ Ibid.,p.v.